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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John A. Chernak*
Liability of Law Enforcement Officer and
Surety for Excessive Force Used in Making a
Misdemeanor Arrest-In an action brought
against a local constable and his official bonds-
man the evidence showed that the defendant
officer had shot at a fleeing car in attempting
to make an arrest for the commission of a
misdemeanor. A shot struck one of the rear
tires, overturning the car, killing one occupant
and seriously injuring another. The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendants on the
ground that the plaintiffs were guilty of a
misdemeanor (public intoxication), which gave
the defendant constable the right to make an
arrest and to use such force as is necessary to
effect the arrest. On appeal the Court of Appeals
of Tennessee reversed.
"[I]t is not true that an officer undertaking
to arrest [for a misdemeanor] has a right to
shoot the offender or endanger his life by
shooting into his automobile to stop it and
effect his arrest." In answer to a contention
that the practice of shooting at fleeing auto-
mobiles is a well-recognized method of stopping
miscreants and law-breakers, the court stated
that this principle does not apply to persons
guilty of a misdemeanor. "Apart from the
peril to innocent users of the highways, such a
practice endangers the lives of petty offenders
not only from mis-aimed gunfire but also from
wrecking the automobile in consequence of
shooting down its tires, as happened in this
case.... The law considers that it is better
to allow him to escape altogether than to take
his life or to do him great bodily harm." The
court went on to observe that such an act is
anti-social, ultra-hazardous and a felony under
the Tennessee statutes. Thus, there is no doubt
that a good cause of action was pleaded against
the constable.
* Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.
An additional problem in the case was
whether the trial judge had properly directed a
verdict for the surety on the constable's
official bond. The bond was conditioned "for
the faithful discharge of the duties" of the
office which it was issued to cover, and, as
such, was an undertaking by the surety that the
officer would properly perform the duties of
his office. Under common law principles, ap-
plied in many states, liability of the surety
will turn on whether the officer acted "by
virtue of office" or under "color of office."
A majority of jurisdictions will hold the surety
liable for both classes of acts; most of the
remaining jurisdictions will hold the surety
only where the officer has acted within the
authority of his office, but improperly. Ten-
nessee has previously adhered to the minority
rule of liability only where the act is done by
virtue of office. Applying this interpretation to
the facts of the instant case the court said:
"[Ihf the occupants of the car had been guilty
of public drunkeness, the constable would have
had authority to arrest them, and his wrongful
act in his attempt to arrest them would have
been an act by virtue of his office for which he
and his sureties would have been liable on his
bond. But, as they were guilty of no offense, he
had no authority to arrest them, and his
wrongful act in his unauthorized attempt to
arrest them was an act under color of office for
which he and his sureties are not liable on his
bond." However, Tennessee has enacted a
statute, the plain meaning of which is that an
officer and his sureties are liable, in addition,
for any wrongful act done under color of office.
Accordingly the trial judge erred in directing a
verdict for the surety, and the issue of their
liability should have been submitted to the
jury. State v. Dunn, 282 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn.
App. 1955).
Civil Action for False Arrest and Imprison-
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ment-The plaintiff sought $350,000 damages
for false arrest and imprisonment by three
members of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment. He alleged that he had been falsely
arrested without a warrant, that newsman had
been called in by the defendants and falsely
informed that plaintiff was a mobster being held
under suspicion of conspiracy to commit
murder, that he was held incommunicado for
three days and that no charges were ever filed
against him. On appeal from a judgment on the
pleadings for the defendants the Supreme
Court of California held that a police officer
who makes an arrest without a warrant and
without justification may be liable for false
arrest and imprisonment in a civil action. A
good cause of action is stated where an arrest
without process followed by imprisonment and
damages is alleged; after proof of which the
burden of showing justification is shifted to the
defendants. Moreover, the allegation that the
defendants had made the statement that they
believed the plaintiff to be a mobster and in-
volved in a criminal conspiracy did not render
the complaint defective, for it does not show as
a matter of law that there was reasonable cause
to make the arrest. The court also stated that
where a lawful arrest is made, "subsequent
unreasonable delay in taking the person before
a magistrate will not affect the legality of the
arrest, although it will subject the offending
person to liability for so much of the imprison-
ment as occurs after the period of necessary or
reasonable delay." Dragna v. White, 289 P.
2d 428 (Cal. 1955).
Law Enforcement Officer's Action Against
Newspaper Publisher for False and Libelous
Statements-The defendant newspaper pub-
lisher had printed an account of an occurrence
in which it alleged that the plaintiff sheriff had
shot a Negro without justification. Shortly
after the publication of this story, to which the
sheriff made no objection, the defendant pub-
lished an editorial denouncing the action taken
by the sheriff. The complaint averred that the
facts stated in the publications falsely charged
the sheriff with a crime and that as such they
were libelous per se. On appeal from a jury
conviction for libel the Supreme Court of
Mississippi reversed on the ground that truth
of the matter alleged was a good defense to an
action for slander or libel. In reversing the
judgment the court considered only that
evidence most favorable to the sheriff. It found
that the fact that no arrest had been made by
the sheriff and that he had not acted in self-
defense established an assault and battery
upon the Negro supported the statements
made in the challenged articles. Smith v.
Byrd, 83 S.2d 172 (Miss. 1955).
Liability of the Municipality for Failure to
Provide Police Protection to an Informer--
The deceased had supplied information to the
police leading to the arrest and conviction of a
notorious criminal, Willie Sutton. Thereafter,
the police widely publicized the deceased's
role in the capture; the deceased and his im-
mediate family received anonymous letters,
missives, notes and telephone messages-
about all of which the police department was
kept informed. Initially, the police department
"undertook a limited and partial protection"
of the deceased's place of business and home,
but thereafter discontinued the protection
despite the continuance of the anonymous
threats. On March 8, 1952 the deceased was
shot and killed by an unidentified assailant.
The administrator of the intestate's estate
brought an action against the City of New
York for damages resulting from the false
representation that the deceased was not in
danger because of the threats, whereby he was
induced to go about without police protection
and was consequently killed. The order of the
Special Term granting a motion to dismiss the
complaint was subsequently affirmed. Schuster
v. The City of New York, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778
(Sup. Ct., App. D. T. 1955).
The majority of the court based their
affirmance of the dismissal on two grounds:
first, that the police were under no duty to give
an informer special protection; second, that if
there were any duty, it only extended to those
situations where the identity of the potential
assailants was known, and from which knowl-
edge violence might reasonably have been
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anticipated. The court held that the allega-
tions of the complaint did not support either
of these propositions.
A dissent argued that since it was the duty of
a citizen to inform and aid the police in captur-
ing felons, a corresponding duty arose on the
part of the government to protect the informer
from "violence while so doing, or on account of
so doing." Thus, the dissent reasoned, the city,
by withdrawing its protection, breached its
duty when it failed to furnish the informer
"such protection as the circumstances and as
ordinary prudence dictated." The dissent
further challenged the position taken by the
majority that the identity of the assailants must
be known to the police, saying that "such a
condition, practically impossible of fulfillment,
should not be allowed to vitiate the city's
positive duty of protection." Finally, the
dissent raised an independent basis for sustain-
ing the complaint. Even if there were no legal
duty to protect the informer from potential
violence, nevertheless, the voluntary assump-
tion of protection for the deceased informer
rendered the city responsible for its negligence
in performing the duty by arbitrarily with-
drawing its protection and leading the de-
ceased to believe that he was safe to travel
freely through the city.
Mandamus Does Not Lie to Compel En-
forcement of Future Violations of Municipal
Ordinance-Petitioners, residents and tax-
payers of the municipality, filed a petition
praying that a writ of mandamus issue to
compel the enforcement of the city parking
ordinances. It was alleged that for a sub-
stantial period of time there had been open and
continuous violations of the parking ordinance;
despite the fact that written notice had been
served on the mayor and chief of police. The
trial court dismissed the petition and this was
affirmed by the appellate court which held that
"mandamus will not lie where to issue the writ
would put into the hands of the court the con-
trol and regulation of the general course of
official conduct or enforcement or enforce the
performance of official duties generally."
People v. City of Park Ridge, 129 N.E.2d 4.38
(Ill. App. 1955). The court did state, however,
that it might issue a writ of mandamus to
command local law enforcement officials to do
a specific act in relation to a past violation of
the law. The theory behind the refusal to issue
a writ of mandamus as to future and general
violations lies in the practical difficulty the
court would face in the supervision over in-
dividual derelictions of duty. The decision did
not discuss the contention of the petitioners
that the complexity of judicial difficulty must
bow to the "superior demands of public safety."
Degree of Knowledge Necessary to Qualify
as Expert Witness on the Harger Breath-O-
Meter-In support of the essential element of
intoxication in a drunk driving prosecution, the
state introduced the testimony of the police
officer who had apprehended the defendant and
subsequently conducted both a manual and a
Harger Breath-O-Meter test upon him. Over
the objection that the witness had not been
properly qualified as an expert, the trial court
admitted testimony that the defendant had
0.19 of I% alcoholic blood content according to
the results of the Breath-O-Meter test. The
defendant's objection was predicated on the
fact that the witness had testified that he did
not know the reaction of chemicals, had not
had any training in mixing the ingredients used
in the test and that he did not know the effects
and reactions of the chemicals. However, he
did state that he had had experience with the
Harger Breath-O-Meter and had been trained
to measure the chemicals in administering the
test. On appeal the admission of this expert
testimony was held to be reversible error. The
court said: "We are of the opinion that an
expert making the test should be competent to
draw his own conclusions, based upon his own
knowledge of the chemical reactions of potas-
sium permanganate, and sulphuric acid. A
conclusion predicated upon something some
one else has prepared is based not on personal
knowledge as an expert, but upon hearsay, and
is therefore incompetent." In summary the
court required that the record must establish
the witness' competency to draw conclusions
on his own observations--not on the basis of a
14561
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chart or guide prepared by another. Riddle v.
State, 288 P.2d 761 (Okla.Cr. 1955).
Coroner's Fees-An action was brought by a
city for a declaration of the right of the coroner
to collect fees in a number of inquests held at
the request of citizens. The city contended that
a coroner is entitled to a fee for an inquest held
upon request only where there are indications,
extrinsic to the mere request, that death
occurred as a result of crime, violence or other
unnatural causes. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky examined the state statutes relating
to the office of coroner and concluded that no
fee can be paid to a coroner unless there is some
basis for belief that a death warrants investi-
gation. This conclusion was found to be con-
sistent with the historical function of the
coroner which is to aid in the administration
of criminal justice by inquiring into deaths
occurring under peculiar or suspicious cir-
cumstances. The coroner is not entitled to his
fee for merely signing a death certificate pur-
suant to a request of a private citizen. City of
Ashland v. Miller, 283 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1955).
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